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The Transformation of a Local Insurgency
“Give the good news to [Abu Baker] al-Baghdadi…. Give 
the good news to the caliph of the believers. Victory is 
coming. And we are your soldiers, God willing,” said a 
masked insurgent in a distinct north Sinai accent on  
October 24, 2014, after successfully destroying the mili-
tary checkpoint of Karam al-Qawadis.1 The insurgents 
had seized a large number of weapons after a twin attack 
on heavily armed military positions in Sheikh Zuweid and 
El-Arish. During fighting, they killed more than thirty 
soldiers, destroyed an American-made M-60 Patton Tank 
and an M-11 armored vehicle, and seized heavy mortars 
and heavy machine guns from the military. The masked 
commander’s video statement was the clearest indica-
tor at the time that Egypt’s strongest armed organiza-
tion – Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (Supporters of Jerusalem, or 
ABM), which had spearheaded the insurgency in the Sinai 
Peninsula since early 2010 – was joining the organization 
Islamic State (ISIS). The latter had already declared a 
“caliphate” on June 29, 2014. 
On November 10, 2014, the affiliation with ISIS became 
official. “The caliphate has been declared in Iraq and al-
Sham [parts of the Levant], and the Muslims have chosen 
a caliph who is the grandson of the best of humans. If that 
is the case, we have no choice but to heed the invitation 
of God’s caller…. We therefore pledge religious-political 
loyalty to Caliph Ibrahim ibn Awad ibn Ibrahim al-Quray-
shi al-Husayni.” That month, ABM changed its name to 
Wilayat Sinai (Sinai Province of the Islamic State, or WS).
The statement, which was disseminated by ABM/WS’s 
media section, was likely spoken by the organization’s 
commander, Abu Osama al-Masri. It put an end to con-
flicting statements issued by ABM/WS-affiliated media 
outlets. An earlier statement, issued on November 3, 2014, 
had declared allegiance to ISIS and called on the “broth-
ers in the Land of the Quiver [Egypt], Libya, Gaza, and 
all Maghreb and Mashreq countries” to declare loyalty to 
ISIS. But on November 4, 2014, a tweet denying the oath 
and challenging the authenticity of the first statement 
was published by one of two Twitter accounts that regu-
larly disseminate ABM’s statements. The two conflicting 
declarations reflected internal divisions within the group 
that will be discussed in greater detail below. The dispute 
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was about swearing allegiance to ISIS or preserving the 
group’s informal affiliation with and ideological affinity 
to Al Qaeda, especially its post-2011 modified strategy of 
mixing political violence with social services in an at-
tempt to win popular support.
The significant military rise of ABM/WS and its com-
plex relationship with ISIS are somewhat puzzling. The 
organization has persisted, and even grown, despite al-
most five years of successive Egyptian counterinsurgency 
campaigns. These campaigns escalated and intensified 
after September 2013, becoming extremely brutal but 
at the same time quite ineffective. As a result, the Sinai-
based insurgency was able not only to endure but also to 
expand its geographical scope, tactical military capacity, 
operational intensity and durations, regional scale, qual-
ity of propaganda and communications, and existential 
legitimacy.
Over the last 15 years, even before the official establish-
ment of ABM/WS, the insurgency in the Sinai Peninsula 
has mutated significantly. Its stated goal changed from 
supporting Palestinian armed organizations in the early 
2000s to controlling areas in northeast Sinai and attempt-
ing to defeat the Egyptian regime’s security and military 
forces there, while declaring transnational loyalties 
(namely to ISIS) in late 2014. Additionally, it fought to 
avenge deaths that occurred during government crack-
downs in the aftermath of the July 2013 military coup 
against former President Mohammed Morsi as well as to 
weaken these forces in areas away from Sinai.
This paper aims to explain the complex relationship be-
tween ABM/WS and ISIS and to examine its implications 
for the former. After a short overview of the historical 
developments that starting in the early 1980s led to the 
gradual escalation of the crisis in Sinai, it examines the 
military capacity of WS from 2014 to 2016 and addresses 
how sociopolitical factors and resources have an impact 
on that capacity. It also examines how links with ISIS 
affect WS’s military capacity. The paper concludes with 
general observations and policy implications for Europe 
and Germany in particular.2
Historical Overview:  
The Making of Wilayat Sinai (1982–2014)
The political, social, structural, security, and humanitar-
ian dimensions of the Sinai crisis go back to the after-
math of the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula 
in 1982. Egyptian security and social policies since then 
have essentially framed Sinai as a threat rather than an 
opportunity. Consequently, the resident of Sinai has been 
cast as a potential informant, potential terrorist, potential 
spy, and/or potential smuggler rather than a full Egyptian 
citizen. In a 2005 US State Department cable published by 
Wikileaks, a senior Egyptian police official in Sinai told a 
visiting American official delegation that “the only good 
Bedouin in Sinai was the dead Bedouin.”3 
The policies based on this perception escalated in the 
aftermath of the second Palestinian intifada in 2000. 
Several Egyptian security bureaucracies – principally the 
State Security Investigations (SSI, now renamed the Na-
tional Security Apparatus), and the General Intelligence 
Apparatus – believe that during the second intifada sev-
eral Palestinian militant groups in Gaza received direct 
logistical support from northeast Sinai. Since then the 
main, consistent feature of Egyptian policy toward the 
region has been a mix of repression and efforts to coopt 
selected tribal leaders into providing useful intelligence.
In October 2004, the simultaneous bombings of tour-
ist resorts in Taba and Nuweiba brought about further 
escalation. The SSI had almost no information about the 
terrorists and therefore conducted a wide crackdown in 
northeast Sinai. With the help of the Central Security 
Forces (CSF), the SSI arrested around three thousand 
people. They took women and children related to sus-
pects hostage until the suspects surrendered. “They 
electrocuted us in the genitals for hours before asking 
any questions. The torture continued during and after the 
interrogations. Many of the young men swore revenge,” 
said a former detainee.4
In July 2005, a second wave of bombings hit Sharm el 
Sheikh. This time, an organization declared responsibility 
for the attacks: Al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad fi Sayna’ (Monothe-
ism and Struggle in Sinai, or TJS). The group was inspired 
by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s organization in Iraq, but de-
spite the Iraqi inspiration, most of its leaders and members 
were locals.5 The founder, Khaled Musa‘id, was a dentist 
from El-Arish City and a member of al-Swaraka tribe, the 
largest and one of the most influential tribes in Sinai. He 
was killed in a firefight with the CSF on September 28, 
2005. Ten years later, in September 2015, ABM/WS paid 
tribute to him as a founder in a 37-minute documentary 
entitled “Soldiers’ Harvest.” Indeed, the main contribution 
of Musa‘id and his men was transforming an ideological 
current found in books and speeches into a real organiza-
tional structure, with a leadership hierarchy and multiple 
cells in five cities/towns within three regions: northeast 
Sinai (al-Arish, Rafah, Sheikh Zuweid), central/central-
east Sinai (Halal Mountain/Nekhel), and Ismailia City.
A second wave of crackdowns began right after the 
2005 bombings. Many suspected TJS members and sym-
pathizers as well as their relatives, acquaintances, and 
neighbors were arrested. “We met them in prison. Most 
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of them did not know anything about ideology, theology, 
or jurisprudence. Some were illiterate, and we had to 
teach them how to read,” said a former Islamist detainee 
who was imprisoned with the “Sinai group,” as they were 
known at the time. “All that the actual TJS members had 
studied were three booklets written by Abu Muhammad 
al-Maqdisi,” he said, referring to a famous Jordanian 
jihadist ideologue, “and this led them to use takfir a lot.”6
The Sinai detainees were mainly distributed in six pris-
ons: Damanhur, Highly Guarded (known as the Scorpion), 
Abu Za‘bal, Liman Tora, New Valley, and Natrun Val-
ley. From 2004 to 2009, they interacted in those prisons 
with former jihadists who had abandoned and disowned 
armed activism. SSI made it possible for the Islamic 
Group (IG), several former leaders of the organization 
al-Jihad, and independent Salafi figures to give them 
lessons in Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh), creed (‘aqida), and 
the “revisions literature” produced by the IG and others 
in their post-jihadist phase, thinking it would provide a 
fruitful counter-narrative to jihadism. It partly worked. 
In prisons, some of the TJS members abandoned the core 
jihadi belief that armed action is the sole theologically 
legitimate, instrumentally effective method for social and 
political change.7 Others did not and were more interest-
ed in avenging their humiliation and repression. This was 
notably the case with Kamal Allam, one of WS’s current 
military commanders.8 
In pre-2011 Sinai, the environment was significantly 
changing. A 2007 conflict in Gaza between factions of 
Hamas and Fatah and a 2009 crackdown by Hamas on 
Salafi jihadists drove both former Fatah’s Preventive Se-
curity officers and members of Jund Ansar Allah (Soldiers 
of the Supporters of God) and their sympathizers into 
northeast Sinai to escape the crackdowns.
 By late 2009, jihadists began to regroup in different 
organizational structures. Al-Tahwid wa al-Jihad – Bayt 
al-Maqdis (Monotheism and Struggle: Jerusalem) is-
sued a booklet on November 17, 2009 entitled “This is 
Our Creed.”9 It did not differ much from the theological 
booklets issued by the Islamic State in Iraq at that time 
to support its ideological version of jihadism. The group 
Ansar al-Sunnah fi Aknaf Bayt al-Maqdis (Supporters of 
the Sunnah near Jerusalem) issued a series of propagan-
da videos documenting operations against Israeli mili-
tary and civilian targets between April and August 2010. 
By late 2010, individuals and factions from these small 
groups had merged to become ABM, which became the 
most active and centralized armed organization in Sinai, 
among at least three other active groups or networks.10 
Between late 2010 and late 2013, ABM was  focusing 
primarily on attacking Israeli civilian and military 
targets. But Egyptian police stations and security head-
quarters were also attacked in January, February, and 
July 2011, partly to avenge the crackdowns of 2004–06 as 
well as to capture weapons. Sinai’s uprising against Hosni 
Mubarak’s regime combined both popular mobilization 
and armed reprisals on security forces. And by early 
February 2011, security forces had fled both the towns of 
Rafah and Sheikh Zuweid.
In response, two major counterinsurgency operations 
were launched by the Egyptian government between 
2011 and 2013: Eagle 1 (under the Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces, or SCAF) and Eagle 2 (under President 
Mohammed Morsi). Both operations failed to quell the 
insurgency and in many ways seemed to be a continu-
ation of previous policies, rather than marking a new 
 counterinsurgency approach. 
The July 2013 military coup against Morsi and the 
August 2013 crackdowns on pro-Morsi and anti-coup 
protestors in Rabaa Square and Nahda Square in Cairo 
had a major impact on Sinai. “We knew torture was on its 
way. It was just a matter of time,” said one of the residents 
of Sheikh Zuweid who had been detained in 2004 for a 
few months.11 In August 2013, Salafi figures and preach-
ers from Sinai held a public conference in Sheikh Zuweid; 
one of the speakers demanded the formation of a “war 
council” to fend off an expected wave of repression. 
After the crackdown in Rabaa Square, there was a 
significant change in the insurgency’s rhetoric, behavior, 
intensity, and scale of operations, as well as in its overall 
narrative and goals. “Morsi admitted leading the cam-
paign against us. But [at that time] the reply of our broth-
ers was limited to defense. We did not deliberately attack 
military headquarters or follow the security officers to tar-
get them. But after what happened after the military coup, 
fighting the armed forces became an urgent necessity,” 
said an ABM member in a rare interview.12 Indeed, ABM 
was highly sensitive to the local developments. It changed 
its rhetoric and narrative primarily to stress the idea that it 
is “defending the Muslims of Egypt against the onslaught 
of an ‘Army of Apostates.’”13 This is a significant departure 
from the narratives of 2010–12, when the organization 
stressed that it was targeting Israel and its interests, while 
attempting to avoid a clash with the local military. 
The November 2014 pledge of allegiance by ABM/
WS – or most of its factions – to ISIS was perhaps the most 
critical and unprecedented development in the history of 
Egyptian jihadism. It was the first time that a local armed 
jihadist organization of ABM’s size declared transnational 
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loyalty to a foreign organization. As previously men-
tioned, the signs of inclination towards ISIS were clear 
from early 2014, despite a January 2014 message by al-
Qaida’s leader, Ayman al-Zawhiri, in which he described 
ABM as “our men in Sinai.” Unconfirmed reports circu-
lated that Kamal Allam and several other men from Sinai 
joined or trained in ISIS and/or Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN) 
camps in Syria in 2013. Other reports mentioned that Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi met with some of the jihadists from 
Sinai who fought in Iraq. He was interested in providing 
logistical support to them as early as 2011.14 In Septem-
ber 2014, ISIS’s official spokesperson, Abu Muhammed 
al-Adnani, called on the “brothers” in Sinai to fight the 
incumbent’s army “in any possible way and to turn their 
lives into hell and horror.” Two months later, ABM had 
publically announced its affiliation with ISIS and changed 
its name to WS.
Wilayat Sinai’s Military Capacity:  
Local, Regional, and International Impact
In November 2015, WS issued its first annual review of 
military operations, reflecting both a common trend of 
ISIS “provinces” and mirroring the practice of regular 
militaries. WS claimed that from October 25, 2014 to 
October 15, 2015 (corresponding to the Islamic lunar year 
of 1436) it had killed more than a thousand pro-regime 
elements, ranging from army and police officers and sol-
diers to local tribesmen accused of being “informants.” It 
also claimed to have destroyed more than 140 tanks and 
armored vehicles and to have razed 30 military/ 
police headquarters and houses of alleged informants. 
The statistics were listed under six categories: “Hunters 
of Armored Vehicles,” “Targeting Individuals,” “Incur-
sions and Destroying Headquarters,” “Demolishing Forts,” 
“Special Operations,” and “Spoils of War.”15
According to the WS statistics, the organization relied 
heavily on improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to destroy 
armored vehicles. These include 24 American-made M-60 
tanks, 17 M-113 armored vehicles, and 17 Hummers.16 To 
a lesser extent, WS used Russian-made “Kornet” anti-
tank guided-missiles and unguided RPG-7 missiles to 
destroy 7 tanks and armored vehicles.17 The organization 
claimed that it has assassinated 130 civilians accused 
of being “informants.” But most of the damage done by 
WS was listed under the category “incursions”: complex 
guerilla operations spearheaded by one or more suicide 
bomber(s) attacking security and military checkpoints 
and headquarters. The alleged death toll resulting from 
these operations was over 800 soldiers.18 In terms of 
“spoils,” the organization was able to capture heavy and 
light weapons from the regular forces and showed some 
of them in its propaganda videos. Captured weapons in 
2015 included heavy mortars (120-mm), two ZU-23 anti-
aircraft autocannons (25-mm), five DShK heavy machine 
guns (14.5-mm), and over fifty AK assault rifles.19 The 
disturbing data is not too far from the reports published 
by the few remaining local journalists and, in some cases, 
some of them match the attacks officially declared by the 
military spokesperson.
As in other ISIS “provinces,” the publications of WS’s 
military metrics and reports occur on a monthly and annu-
al basis. In January–February 2016 (corresponding to the 
lunar month of Rabi‘ Thani), WS issued its monthly “har-
vest of military operations,” declaring the alleged destruc-
tion of 25 armored/vehicles (including tanks, minesweep-
ers, and bulldozers) and the alleged killing of over 100 
soldiers.20 This was done via an overwhelming reliance on 
IEDs (59 percent of the operations), followed by guerilla 
attacks (20 percent), and then by snipers (12 percent). The 
rest of the fatalities were due to close-quarter assassina-
tions of commanders and informants (9 percent).21 In the 
summer of 2016, WS was able to capture a tank and two 
armored vehicles. Its elements were shown maneuvering 
with the captured tank in a propaganda video released in 
August 2016, and entitled “Desert Flames.”
That military capacity and the mere ability of WS to 
survive after some five years of military campaigns and 
security sweeps is puzzling for several reasons. First, 
geographically, Sinai’s northeastern coastal terrain is 
not rugged. Most of the high mountains such as the 
peaks of Mount Catherine and Mount Sinai are in the 
south of the peninsula, far away from the bulk of the 
insurgency. Clashes occurred in the Halal Mountain in 
central Sinai, but it is not the main theater of operations. 
Second, Sinai’s population is relatively small. North Sinai 
Governorate has a population of 434,781 (40 persons per 
square mile). Most of the armed action happens in three 
out of its six districts: El-Arish, Sheikh Zuweid, and Rafah 
(all mainly flat coastal districts on the Mediterranean), 
with a total population of about 300,000. Third, loyalty 
seems to be divided within this relatively small population. 
Almost every northeastern tribe and clan has members 
and supporters of the insurgency, but it also has support-
ers, informants, and pro-incumbent armed tribesmen. 
The divisions do not follow clear rural-urban, settler-
bedouin, tribal, or administrative lines. Each of these 
categories has elements on both sides. Finally, there is no 
state sponsorship for the insurgents. None of the region’s 
governments are directly or systematically supportive of 
its elements, including the Hamas authorities in Gaza. On 
the other hand, the regime’s military forces alone enjoy 
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an  estimated 500:1 power ratio, at the very least.22 This is 
in addition to the support provided by the United States in 
terms of financing, training, equipping, and intelligence 
as well as the support provided by Israel in terms of intelli-
gence sharing and tactical and operational coordination.23 
The insurgency has survived on the local, national, 
and regional levels, however, and it has done so for sev-
eral reasons. These include the tactical and operational 
accumulative experiences and capacities of the insur-
gents (2003–present), the mediocre and indiscriminately 
repressive counterinsurgency and counterterrorism poli-
cies of the incumbents (1999–present), the socioeconomic 
policies toward Sinai and its repercussions (1982–present), 
the sociopolitical environment especially after July 2013, 
and, finally, the militarization of regional politics, its sus-
tained escalation, and the resulting unstable sociopoliti-
cal environments. Here I focus on the last factor and what 
it means for the impact of ISIS on northern Sinai. 
WS employs mainly three types of tactics and field 
operations, all very similar to those used by ISIS. The 
first are the common tactics of urban terrorism. These 
include attacks in cities and towns via a combination 
of car bombs, suicide attacks, and targeted assassina-
tions. The second type is guerrilla warfare. Small, mobile 
units employ hit-and-run tactics on security and military 
targets. They are usually lightly armed and consistent 
in avoiding a prolonged direct confrontation with the 
incumbent’s forces. Guerrilla warfare is not new to Egypt. 
It certainly precedes the establishment of WS. What is 
new is the quality of tactics and field operations employed 
by the insurgents in Sinai, which in many ways mimics 
the ISIS tactics in Syria, Iraq, and Libya but also mimics 
regular Special Forces tactics.24 Since early 2014, WS has 
used a combination of heavy (120-mm) and light (60-mm) 
mortar artillery, guided and unguided surface-to-surface 
missiles, guided surface-to-air missiles, heavy machine 
guns, and snipers to cover the advance or retreat of 
infantry formations composed of tens (and in very few 
cases, hundreds) of militants. These irregular formations 
attempted to control territory several times, including the 
attempt on the town of Sheikh Zuweid in July 2015. WS 
controls several villages and stretches of land south of 
Sheikh Zuweid and Rafah. 
Based on the pattern of operations in the last two years, 
WS seems to aim for a sustained engagement with the 
incumbent’s forces in a long war of attrition. This is a text-
book Maoist style of insurgency but very similar as well 
to some of the tactics used by ISIS in Iraq, especially the 
military units operating in Salah al-Din, Al-Anbar, and 
Diyala provinces. They rely partly on subversive tactics 
to lower the morale of the regular soldiers. This is done 
through the sustained targeting of the regime’s forces and 
the brutality of executing captured soldiers and officers, 
with the aim of destroying or undermining the soldiers’ 
will, not necessarily their capacity, to fight. Like other 
ISIS “provinces,” WS also aims to “blind” the regime’s 
forces by targeting their local networks of informants, 
including informants protected in Cairo.25 This is done 
regardless of the “informant’s” tribal affiliation, and the 
list of victims include figures from the same tribes as the 
WS commanders. 
Put together, this is a mild version of the ISIS strategy 
outlined in one of its guides, Managing Brutality.26 Simply 
put, the tactics and policies outlined in that book focus on 
how to manage instability in a way that allows ISIS to ex-
clusively capitalize and to prevent any other actor(s) from 
doing so (including for example pro-democracy activists 
and non-ISIS armed actors, in addition to pro-regime 
elements and status-quo forces). So far, WS is in the first 
phase of this strategy: still attempting to secure strong-
holds and not just survive within them. Unlike some of 
the other ISIS “provinces,” WS has no conventional or 
unconventional capacity to win in military terms. It needs, 
however, to continue gaining support and resources to be 
able to stay in the fight. 
But where do the resources come from and what is the 
extent of their connection to ISIS? Arming, training, and 
recruiting are the three most important pillars bolstering 
WS’s military strategy. The regime’s figures and support-
ers claim that Libya and Gaza are the sources of arms, 
and accuse Turkey, Qatar, Israel, and the United States 
of conspiring with the insurgents.27 The alleged support 
from the latter four countries is mere low-quality pro-
paganda, not supported by any credible evidence. In the 
case of Gaza, most of the credibly uncovered arms flow 
was from Sinai to Gaza rather than in the other direction. 
Whereas the flow of arms from Libya has been credibly 
established, many of WS’s arms are in fact taken from the 
incumbent’s forces during local attacks. 
Given the fact that WS – so far – lacks any significant 
amounts of precision weapons (guided missiles, guided 
artillery shells, or an air force), it relies heavily on IEDs 
and vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) to spearhead its at-
tacks. For precision, VBIEDs are sometimes driven by a 
suicide bomber (there were 12 such operations in 2015).28 
Whereas suicide bombings were used in Egypt before WS, 
the enhanced capacity of IED-making and the immediate 
military capitalization on the damage caused by them are 
not only new but are a highlight of ISIS tactical advan-
tages and military victories in Syria, Libya, and Iraq.29 WS 
followed the pattern.
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Given the importance of IEDs to WS’s strategy, it is 
worth mentioning that the sources of IEDs are primarily 
local. Previous wars scattered landmines and artillery 
shells throughout the Sinai Peninsula. These are modi-
fied by specialists and reused as IEDs.30 Quarries in the 
mountain also use explosive materials, which have been 
reportedly acquired by WS elements either by purchase 
(mainly from black markets via middlemen), cooperation 
(supporters, sympathizers, and/or revenge-seekers), or 
force  (raiding). The latter are also modified in various 
ways.31
In terms of transnational connections, there have been 
quite a few established ones in Libya and Syria. A main 
link between WS and eastern Libyan jihadists was Lt. 
Colonel Hesham al-‘Ashmawy and his group (al-Murabi-
tun). The former Special Forces officer-turned-insurgent 
was responsible for training ABM units in 2014.32 He later 
defected with a small faction from ABM, protesting the 
organization’s oath of loyalty to ISIS. ‘Ashmawy was then 
based in eastern Libya and was accused of conducting 
attacks on military units stationed in Egypt’s Western 
Desert. In Libya, he was allegedly involved on another 
front; ISIS in Derna wanted him dead for joining the 
Derna Mujahidiyyn Consultative Council. The latter is an 
armed Islamist coalition that successfully forced ISIS out 
of Derna to the outskirts in July 2015.
Links between WS and Syria have also been well 
established. “We came to you [al-Sisi] from the Levant,” 
said one of WS’s bomb makers in the propaganda video 
entitled “The Charge of the Supporters 2.” Overall, WS 
draws its skilled military members from three categories: 
1) the defected members of the Egyptian armed forces 
(including former Special Forces, Navy as well as Police 
officers)33; 2) battle-hardened insurgents trained in for-
eign combat zones, including Gaza, Syria and Iraq and 3) 
persistent local insurgents, who accumulated significant 
experience both in combating the regular forces and in 
building logistical support networks over the last decade.
Given Egypt’s counterinsurgency blunders, the policies 
of the current regime, and the overall repressive political 
environment, WS has no problems recruiting from both 
the Sinai Peninsula and the Nile Valley. Much local testi-
mony reflects this. “In my village, we knew of five young 
men who joined the Ansar [ABM] in 2012. Now [in 2015], 
we think they are over thirty,” said a local journalist.34 
The new recruits are usually given basic military train-
ing in Sinai. In February 2016, WS issued a report entitled 
“Silent Death,” in which it announced the graduation 
of new recruits from what it called “Abu Hajar al-Masri 
Camp” in Sinai.35 At least 13 masked trainees were shown 
in the report while training on urban incursion tactics 
and conventional battlefield mobility with assault rifles, 
handguns, as well as hand-to-hand combat.
In addition to direct recruitment and training, WS 
has an effective spy network. “They are warned before 
the Apaches or the tanks reach their targets ... they have 
too many friends here,” said another local.36 This sense 
of grievance, bitterness, and even animosity toward the 
incumbent’s forces is primarily a product of the counter-
insurgency policies employed, and it is one of the most 
important factors in creating these “friendships.”
Concluding Observations and Policy 
Implications
The crisis in Sinai is multi-dimensional, and it continues 
to evolve. Addressing it successfully requires a complex 
and nuanced counterinsurgency policy, especially in 
the mid-to-long term. Certainly, this involves a major 
departure from current policies, which are as intensively 
repressive as they are ineffective. Counterinsurgency 
literature has made the consequences of such policies all 
too familiar: nothing drives locals into the arms of the in-
surgents more effectively than wide-scale, indiscriminate, 
vengeful repression committed by an incumbent regime’s 
forces, particularly when those forces are undergoing a 
crisis of legitimacy. The pillars of Egypt’s current coun-
terinsurgency policy undermine each other. The specific 
type of repression applied in Sinai is a strong disincentive 
to potential informants, collaborators, and supporters, 
while army propaganda, which consistently needs verifi-
cation from other sources, is misleading and ineffective.
The deteriorating situation in Sinai affects Europe 
for various reasons that are already well known. These 
include threats to the stability of the region, to the 1979 
Peace Agreement between Egypt and Israel, to the se-
curity of allies, and to ongoing efforts to counter terror-
ism and violent extremism. In the short term, European 
governments should urge the rulers of Egypt to undertake 
an overall policy change in northern Sinai. The first step 
would be to stop spreading negative media stereotypes 
about residents of Sinai. It also involves enhancing the 
credibility of the official statements and the sustainably 
of its policies in the region. This is essential to building 
stronger local intelligence and support networks. More 
reliance on such networks, in addition to better-trained 
and equipped special forces – while limiting the usage 
of heavy artillery and aerial bombardment in residential 
areas – will positively affect the overall objectives. 
Europe should also urge the Egyptian regime to put in 
place a policy of “winning hearts and minds.” A good place 
to start would be to provide appropriate  compensation to 
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the residents of demolished homes and the owners of de-
stroyed farms, and to acknowledge the “collateral damage” 
done by the military.
In the mid to long term, Cairo must stop treating Sinai 
as merely a threat to its geostrategic security. Europe can 
help convince military officials to revise and alter policies 
that are based on such assumptions. Moreover, aspects 
of the Sinai problem are rooted in Egypt’s overall crisis: 
its lack of national reconciliation, the extreme polariza-
tion of its current political environment, the absence of 
mechanisms for non-violent conflict resolution, the lack 
of security sector reform, and the structural deficiency 
in civil-military relations.37 When it comes to Sinai, that 
civil-military deficiency relates specifically to the lack of 
oversight over national security policy formulation, its 
 execution, in addition to the general lack of  accountability 
when such policies fail or when they exacerbate a crisis. 
A thorough revision of the military and security 
policies in Sinai has never taken place. The only open 
discussion of Sinai to occur took place during the brief 
transition period between February 2011 and June 2013. 
It did not yield any executive policy, and it died quickly 
following the coup of July 2013. This needs to change. In 
general, insurgencies, both those that are exclusively lo-
cal or those with transnational links, do not pose a major 
threat to legitimate, well-institutionalized governments 
that follow competent counterinsurgency practices. This 
is not the case in Egypt, where legitimacy is contested, 
institutions are corrupt, and counterinsurgency practices 
have been far from ideal. In short, Egypt’s failing counter-
insurgency and counterterrorism efforts require signifi-
cant domestic reforms and policy changes. 
Finally, Europe’s involvement is needed on ethical 
grounds. Germany is the third biggest arms exporter in 
the world and the fifth biggest supplier of arms to the 
Middle East. Between 2002 and 2009, German arms 
manufacturers were permitted to supply the Mubarak 
regime with weapons worth more than 32.9 million 
euros.38 As noted above, this was the time when the crisis 
escalated in the Sinai Peninsula. Germany now needs to 
ensure robust human rights vetting for all military aid 
and security assistance to the regime. It also needs to 
conduct full end-user agreement monitoring of German 
military equipment in the Sinai Peninsula. 
Omar Ashour (@DrOmarAshour on Twitter) is a senior 
lecturer in security studies at the University of Exeter (UK) 
and an associate fellow at Chatham House. His book 
The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed 
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